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Abstract
Online social networks, like Facebook, are popular social networking websites, on which hundreds of millions
of users make friends and interact with people. There is a large amount of personal information in these networking
websites and their security is rather concerned by both users and researchers, because valuable private information will
bring great proﬁt to some people or groups. In the real world, proﬁts motivate people and groups to obtain the personal
private data lawlessly and many attacks are launched on the social networks. Facing various attacks, distinct protective
strategies are proposed by researches to reduce the negative effect of attacks. However, the practical performance of
protections is unknown when they are battling with the real attacks. Moreover, we also understand little about how
strong attacks would be when they are facing protections. Therefore, this paper proposes an Attack-Protect-Attack
(APA) comparison scheme to explore the performance and bias of various attack algorithms and protective strategies
for online social networks. By this way, the comparison results are valuable and meaningful for further protection of
private information. We apply several attacking and protective approaches on a real-world dataset from Facebook, then
evaluate them by the accuracy of attack algorithms. Following the comparison scheme, the experiments demonstrate
that the performance of protective strategies is not satisfactory in the complex and practical case.
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1. Introduction
Currently, the online social networks, like Facebook, Twitter, are so popular that they becomes one of the signif-
icant ways for hundreds of millions people to make friends and interact with them on the Internet. According to the
statistics, Facebook is utilized by more than 500 million users and more than 700 billion minutes are spent on it per
month [1]. Another example is Twitter. It recently reports that it had reached approximately 50 million tweets every
day, that is an average of 600 tweets per second [2]. Online social networks are attracting more and more people to
join them because they offer an effective way to interact with friends and share information by text and photo.
Due to the existing of a large amount online users’ personal information, privacy issue turns to be a sensitive
and vital topic. Most of the time, online social networks acquiescently allow people to publish all their proﬁles. In
the meanwhile they also allow people to enable privacy restriction on their personal information. Take Facebook as
an example, users can set some or all of their proﬁles, such as age or university, hidden from strangers. However,
adversaries can still exploit some sensitive information or even identify users with the help of social links. For
instance, the adversaries can ﬁnd out someone’s friendship by directly checking his/her friends list which is available
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on Facebook, or query the list of following and followed of users in Twitter. [3, 4, 5] demonstrate that this information
can leak quite a large quantity of sensitive information.
For certain commercial or political purposes, some persons and groups are eager to obtain valuable personal
information, which motivates attack on the online social networks. In the current business world, users’ personal
information is valuable to some companies. Once the privacy information is leaked, it is probably lawlessly utilized
to make proﬁt. For example, after obtaining the privacy information, a company can advertise for itself or other
commercial groups by users’ personal contact ways (e.g., cell phone, email) according to users’ backgrounds and
preferences. Thus, attacks bring great fortune and are not easy to be detected, which motivates people or groups to
thieve the valuable privacy information of hundreds of millions of online users.
On the other side, because of the informational security, protection of privacy information attracts more and more
attentions gradually. Online users always try their best to require the operation teams of online social networks to
protect their privacy even sensitive information. Moreover, the operation teams gradually realize that the results of
attacks will disturb users’ normal lives and bring some trials to them. Generally, online social networks setup a
function and allow people to enable privacy restriction on their proﬁles. For instance, users can set some or all of
their proﬁles, such as age or university, hidden from strangers or common friends. However, the general setting is
not stringent enough. Therefore, more and more protective strategies, e.g., access control [6, 7] and anonymization
techniques [8], are proposed and protection for online social networks turns to be a hot topic in research.
In applications, one of the basic and important concerns is what performance the protective strategies will have
when they are facing attacks. It would be not so convinced that one protective strategy is claimed to be effective
because it reduces the probability of re-identiﬁcation. The real world is complex and it is difﬁcult for us to evaluate
the practical effect of protection in real case only by reviewing the probability. It must be more satisfactory that the
protective strategies still perform well when they are facing attacks. In other words, if the accuracy of attacks are
greatly depressed after the protective operations, we can convincingly claim that the protection is effective. Thus,
for evaluating the security level of online social networks, it is in great need to group the algorithms of attack and
protection in the comparison sequence.
In this paper, we explore a range of attack approaches and protective strategies, in order to better understand the
performance and biases of diversiﬁed attacks and protections on the online social networks. We crawl the data from
Facebook and preprocessing them manually. Then we launch ﬁve attacks including machine learning methods and
graph theory method, and ﬁve protective algorithms including clustering-based and modiﬁcation-based approaches.
In order to evaluate the practical effect of protections, we design the Attack-Protect-Attack (APA) scheme for compar-
isons. The attack approaches will be applied on the original data and the protected one, then the results are compared
to evaluate the performances of them. On the other side, the protective approaches need to rise to the challenges from
attacks. Though this APA scheme, we may intuitionally ﬁnd out the practical effect of various protective approaches
for online social networks when they facing real attacks.
Our contributions include:
• In order to better protect privacy information on social networks, we ﬁrst explore the performance and
biases of diversiﬁed attacks and protections in the attack-protect-attack scheme. On one side, in the APA
comparison scheme, we learn the protective performance by comparing the accuracy of attacks before and after
the protections. On the other side, we try to understand the attack bias by comparing the different effects on
the protected data with various protective strategies. Thought these comparisons, we can better understand both
attacks and protections. Additionally, it can lead researchers to propose stronger protective strategy and protect
the private or sensitive information on online social networks.
• We observe that the current anonymization strategies for privacy protection cannot achieve satisﬁed
result in the complex and practical case. The performance of protections is not satisfactory in the real-world
scenario, in which more proﬁle and relationship information is accessible.
This paper is organized as follow. We brieﬂy describe various attack algorithms and protective approaches in the
Section 2. Then, we give details on datasets and the attack-protect-attack scheme in the experiments in Section 3.
Finally, we show some related works in Section 4 and conclude the paper in Section 5.
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2. Algorithm
Similar to [9], we deﬁne an online social network as an undirected graph G(V, E). In G(V, E), every vertex (user)
has feature vector pi and every edge (relationship) has weighted value wi, j, which may consider friendship, group
membership and network relationship, where 0 ≤ pi,wi, j ≤ 1. In the whole graph, there are l labeled vertices and the
labels of u vertices need to be predicted. For attacks, the objective is to let the prediction result of u vertices’ labels
agree with the true labels. On the other side, protections tend to reduce the accuracies of the prediction of attacks.
In the APA comparison scheme, attacks and protection will be executed alternately. In this scheme, we ﬁrst
apply attack methods on the online social networks and mark down the accuracy of them. Then, we utilize protective
approaches to hide or modify the vital information on the original networks, and generalize a new safe network to
be published. Finally, we adopt all attacks again on the new networks to ﬁnd out how big the impact would be and
how effective in practice the protections would be. We evaluate the protective approaches indirectly by the impact
of attacks instead of some criteria only considering protection, e.g., percentage of hidden information and loss of
information. On the same time, the attacks are evaluated by the criterion of accuracy. The comparison scheme is
shown in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Attack-Protect-Attack Comparison Scheme
Input: Social graph G(V, E) and labels information.
1: for every attack approach Ai do
2: for every protective approach Pj do
3: Attack on G and obtain the prediction accuracy R0(Ai).
4: Apply a protection approach Pj on G and obtain a protected social graph Gp.
5: Apply the same attack approach Ai on Gp and obtain the new prediction accuracy R1(Ai, Pj).
6: end for
7: end for
8: Compare R0 & R1 and evaluate the performances of attacks and protections.
We compare various attack approaches and protective strategies to better understand the performance and affection
of them. The relationship of these approaches is shown in Fig. 1. We mainly focus on twofold:
• Effect of Attacks. We apply ﬁve attack approaches in online social networks and evaluate their performance.
They are Supervised Learning (SL) approach [5], Local and Global Consistency (LGC) Semi-Supervised Learn-
ing (SSL) approach [9], Co-Training SSL approach [9], Community-based Graph (CG) SSL approach [10] and
Graph Theory of Maximum Flow & Minimum Cut (MFMC) approach [11].
• Effect of Protections. Based on the ﬁrst point, we evaluate the attacks performance before and after the
protections respectively, in order to further analyze the protective strategies. We compare the effects of ﬁve
protective strategies. They are Vertex Clustering (VC) method [12], Edge Clustering (EC) method [13], Vertex
and Edge Clustering (VEC) method [14], Randomize Graph Modiﬁcation (RGM) method [15] and Greedy
Graph Modiﬁcation (GGM) method [16].
(a) Attack Approaches (b) Protective Approaches
Figure 1: The Relationship of Various Attack and Protective Approaches
3. Experiments
In the experiments, we apply both attack and protection approaches on the attack-protect-attack scheme. In this
scheme, attacks try to classify an unknown feature on the Facebook dataset and are evaluated by accuracy. The results
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Table 1: Statistics of Facebook Dataset
Dataset Vertices Edges Groups Networks Classes
Facebook 10, 410 45, 842 61 78 3
show that protective approaches do reduce the ponderance of attack and protect the information in most cases. But
the effect of protection becomes less in the more complex case.
Dataset. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of various algorithms of attack and protection, we crawl one real-
world data from the online social network Facebook. The Facebook dataset is a complex network with a large amount
of personal attribute information and community information, which help a lot in attacks. The details of the dataset
are shown in the Subsection 3.1.
Objective. In this dataset, attacks always try to expose some unknown attribute of users and protections are to
hide/modify some personal or relational information. In the Facebook dataset, attack algorithms try to predict the
university the user attends as their objectives. The higher accuracy the attacks achieve, the stronger attacking methods
would be. In contrast, the worse prediction of attacks suggests the better protection.
Method There are ﬁve attack and ﬁve protective algorithms applied on the APA comparison scheme. We ﬁrst apply
ﬁve attack algorithms on two datasets with protections. Then ﬁve protective approaches are operated respectively on
the original data. At last, ﬁve attacks are launched again on the result of every protective approach.
3.1. Data Description & Preprocessing
The real-world dataset is crawled from the Internet and manually preprocessed. It contains more than ten thousand
users (vertices) in the networks. The Facebook dataset is a complex and practical one with sufﬁcient link and proﬁle
information, which may increase the difﬁculty of protection and affect the performance of protection.
The Facebook dataset has sufﬁcient proﬁle information of users and all kinds of relational information, thus it is
similar to the situation of the real world. Three university names are used as class (label) names. Table 2 gives the
number of users in each class.
Table 2: Statistics of Data Distribution on Facebook Dataset
University CUHK HKUST (Others)
Size of Class 68 1, 583 8, 759
Feature Selection. In Facebook dataset, there are 26 features for each user, however, not all of them are needed.
In fact, some features such as nickname provide little information for classiﬁcation. Besides, most people ﬁll only a
few of these features, for instance, very few people provide information for work phone and current location. Thus,
according to the statistic result for 26 features, we select top three features for which most people provide information.
After excluding nickname, we ﬁnally choose gender, birthday and home town as basic proﬁle information of each user
(vertex) for classifying.
For relational information, it also needs to select the helpful data. The original group number of Facebook data is
371. Among these groups, most of them are made up with only a small number of people. Thus, a number of small
groups are removed and ﬁnally 61 groups left. Networks are processed similarly. Apart from that, some networks
whose names explicitly reveal universities’ names, such as “CUHK” and “HKUST” are removed manually.
Data Translation. Since some data from the real world are not directly computable, we need to translation them
into the proper forms. For example, home town is just a string and it is a bad way to calculate the similarity of two
users’ home town through comparing two strings. Therefore, we translate home town to its longitude and latitude
values through Google maps API.
Although top three features information that most users ﬁll are selected, the number of missing value is still very
large and noise information, like birthday with value “〈1/1/ 0001〉”, exists widespreadly in datasets. For age, missing
data are ﬁlled with average value of existing data and noise data are treated as missing ones. For gender, 0.5 is
used to represent missing value (1 represents male and 0 represents female). For hometown, missing data are ﬁlled
respectively with average value of longitude and latitude of his friends. Thus, a user’s basic information could be
expressed by using a vector which contains its age, gender, hometown’s longitude and latitude.
The value of every attribute in users’ proﬁle is scaled to [0, 1] and the cosine similarity between any two proﬁle
vectors is calculated. If both of them fail to provide at least 50% information, we set the cosine similarity with mean
value.
Another kind of similarity is obtained from relational information, i.e., friendship. Two users’ friendship similarity
is computed through 1 divided by the shortest hop(s) between them. For example, if two users are friends (linked
directly), the hop between them is 1 and the similarity is also 1; if two users are not directly linked but they both link
to another user, the shortest hops between them is 2 and thus we set their friendship similarity as 12 .
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3.2. Experiment Process
Labeled Data Selection. Labeled data are selected randomly with two constrains below:
• Each class must have labeled data;
• The numbers of labeled data in all classes are similar.
The second point suggests an assumption that we do not know the distribution of all classes when labeling data.
Evaluation Criterion. We mainly utilize the accuracy to measure the results of predictions (attacks). The classic
accuracy is obtained by
Accuracy =
|Vcorrect |
|Vcorrect | + |Vincorrect | =
|Vcorrect |
l + u
, (1)
where Vcorrect is a set containing all the vertices whose predictions are correct and Vincorrect contains all incorrect-
prediction vertices.
3.3. Attack Before Protection
We ﬁrstly want to check the situation without protections. In this scenario, we launch ﬁve attack algorithms on the
original datasets after data preprocessing. Table 3 and Figure 2(a) demonstrate the learning accuracy of all attacks.
Table 3: Attack Accuracy of Five Algorithms on Facebook Dataset
Labeled Labeled SL LGC Co-Training CG MFMC
Data # Data %
25 0.24% 36.74% 60.70% 55.26% 63.09% 56.79%
250 2.40% 47.65% 66.86% 62.16% 74.94% 61.27%
1000 9.61% 51.56% 68.05% 64.71% 75.43% 63.04%
2500 24.02% 51.92% 69.21% 68.84% 79.81% 66.98%
(a) Attack Accuracy of Five Algorithms (b) Accuracy of Supervised Learning Method
After Various Protections
(c) Accuracy of LGC Learning Method After
Various Protections
(d) Accuracy of Co-Trainging Learning
Method After Various Protections
(e) Accuracy of CG Learning Method After
Various Protections
(f) Accuracy of MFMC Method After Various
Protections
Figure 2: The Experimental Results on Faceboook Dataset
3.4. Attack After Protection
Based on the original dataset, ﬁve protective strategies are applied to hide/modify some useful proﬁle or relation-
ship information. On each protective result, ﬁve attack algorithms are launched again and kept being evaluated with
the same criterion. Table 4 illustrates the accuracy of all attacks after protections.
3.5. Comparisons of Attack and Protection Algorithms
3.5.1. Attack
We try to understand the attack bias by comparing the different effects on the protected data with various protective
strategies.
Figure 2(b) shows the learning accuracy of supervised learning before and after protections. Besides Vertex
Clustering method, other protective strategies obviously reduce the learning accuracy to low level and protect the
information in the network. More speciﬁcally, Vertex & Edge Clustering, Randomize Graph Modiﬁcation and Greedy
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Table 4: Attack Accuracy of Five Algorithms after Protections on Facebook Dataset
Protected Labeled Labeled SL LGC Co-Training CG MFMC
by Data # Data %
Vertex
Clustering
25 0.24% 28.51% 53.62% 50.28% 60.53% 49.76%
250 2.40% 41.32% 61.75% 52.71% 71.67% 52.31%
1000 9.61% 45.14% 64.31% 57.83% 71.34% 58.81%
2500 24.02% 47.93% 65.59% 63.32% 77.25% 62.12%
Edge
Clustering
25 0.24% 28.22% 50.32% 50.00% 58.82% 45.73%
250 2.40% 29.32% 58.09% 54.24% 70.13% 46.69%
1000 9.61% 29.90% 61.22% 56.41% 71.63% 48.68%
2500 24.02% 31.19% 64.47% 62.98% 76.52% 55.11%
Vertex
& Edge
Clustering
25 0.24% 26.24% 50.84% 43.16% 55.44% 37.31%
250 2.40% 25.71% 57.52% 50.57% 67.70% 45.97%
1000 9.61% 27.82% 59.37% 52.19% 69.20% 48.41%
2500 24.02% 29.27% 60.18% 58.39% 76.48% 53.29%
Randomize
Graph
Modiﬁcation
25 0.24% 26.25% 51.93% 48.74% 59.76% 48.88%
250 2.40% 27.55% 60.69% 51.64% 66.38% 50.01%
1000 9.61% 27.99% 63.27% 53.04% 71.98% 53.66%
2500 24.02% 28.38% 65.40% 60.56% 75.07% 60.48%
Greedy
Graph
Modiﬁcation
25 0.24% 22.12% 45.41% 43.33% 55.12% 40.32%
250 2.40% 24.86% 53.26% 48.18% 65.74% 44.94%
1000 9.61% 25.23% 59.07% 52.69% 69.07% 49.72%
2500 24.02% 27.59% 62.38% 57.82% 73.93% 52.67%
Graph Modiﬁcation strategies can effectively reduce accuracy to 30% or lower and the protections are satisﬁed. On
the other side, these illustrate supervised learning as an attack method is weak and it can be resisted by some protective
strategies.
Figure 2(c) shows the learning accuracy of local and global consistency learning before and after protections.
Although the accuracy of learning fall in different level due to various protective strategies, the learning results keep
being improved when the number of labeled data is increased. Moreover, the difference between new and original
learning accuracies become smaller and smaller when percentage of labeled data increases. This suggests that LGC
learning method can effectively utilize known and unknown information and this kind of attack is stronger than the
supervised learning one. The last point is LGC leaning is more sensitive to the Greedy Graph Modiﬁcation Strategy
than the others, because the GGM strategy reduces the learning accuracy of LGC most in most test cases.
Figure 2(d) shows the learning accuracy of co-training learning before and after protections. Generally, all ﬁve
protective strategies can prevent leaking of hidden information and performance of the Co-Training learning is not
strong enough. When the number of labeled data is increasing, the accuracy is kept lower than the original accuracy
5% to 10%. Figure 2(d) illustrates that Co-Training learning method is not sensitive to a speciﬁc protective strategy,
because Co-Training method is a wrapper containing different classiﬁers inside and different classiﬁer would be
sensitive to some speciﬁc protective strategies.
Figure 2(e) shows the learning accuracy of community-based graph learning before and after protections. Ac-
cording to the ﬁgure, we ﬁnd that Community-based Graph learning is a strong attacking model, because there is no
protective strategy can strongly reduce its learning accuracy. Comparatively, Greedy Graph Modiﬁcation is the most
effective method to protect the information under the attack from CG learning model.
Figure 2(f) shows the learning accuracy of maximum ﬂow & minimum cut method before and after protections.
MFMC attack model is sensitive the protective strategies, especially two Graph Modiﬁcation strategies. MFMC is
a good attack model and its prediction accuracy can reach approximately 70%. However, when it facing various
protections, it seems powerless and the accuracy even lower than 40%.
3.5.2. Protection
In the APA comparison scheme, we learn the protective performance by comparing the accuracy of attacks before
and after the protections. According to the Table 4, we can easily obtain the reduction (percentage) of attack accuracy
of all prediction models. The reduction is computed in this way
Reduction = (1 − Accuracyprotection
Accuracyoriginal
) × 100%, (2)
where Accuracyoriginal is the learning accuracy before protection, while Accuracyprotection is that after protection. The
result is shown in the Table 5.
From the above table, we obtain some observations.
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Table 5: Reduction of Attack Accuracy of Five Algorithms after Protections on Facebook Dataset
Protected Labeled Labeled SL LGC Co-Training CG MFMC
by Data # Data %
Vertex
Clustering
25 0.24% 22.40% 11.66% 9.01% 4.06% 12.38%
250 2.40% 13.28% 7.64% 15.20% 4.36% 14.62%
1000 9.61% 12.45% 5.50% 10.63% 5.42% 6.71%
2500 24.02% 7.68% 5.23% 8.02% 3.21% 7.26%
Edge
Clustering
25 0.24% 23.19% 17.10% 9.52% 6.77% 19.48%
250 2.40% 38.47% 13.12% 12.74% 6.42% 23.80%
1000 9.61% 42.01% 10.04% 12.83% 5.04% 22.78%
2500 24.02% 39.93% 6.85% 8.51% 4.12% 17.72%
Vertex
& Edge
Clustering
25 0.24% 28.58% 16.24% 21.90% 12.13% 34.30%
250 2.40% 46.04% 13.97% 18.65% 9.66% 24.97%
1000 9.61% 46.04% 12.76% 19.35% 8.26% 23.21%
2500 24.02% 43.62% 13.05% 15.18% 4.17% 20.44%
Randomize
Graph
Modiﬁcation
25 0.24% 28.55% 14.45% 11.80% 5.28% 13.97%
250 2.40% 42.18% 9.23% 16.92% 11.42% 18.38%
1000 9.61% 45.71% 7.02% 18.03% 4.57% 14.88%
2500 24.02% 45.34% 5.50% 12.03% 5.94% 9.70%
Greedy
Graph
Modiﬁcation
25 0.24% 39.79% 25.19% 21.59% 12.63% 29.00%
250 2.40% 47.83% 20.34% 22.49% 12.26% 26.65%
1000 9.61% 51.07% 13.20% 18.58% 8.43% 21.13%
2500 24.02% 46.86% 9.87% 16.01% 7.37% 21.36%
• Vertex Clustering is not a strong protective strategy and the most effective protections are against supervised
learning attack and co-training attack.
• Edge Clustering is stronger and most reduction of attack accuracy is over 10%, even up to 40%. Furthermore,
when it is facing SL and MFMC attacks, the protections are effective, because SL and MFMC attacks are rather
depend on edges information and few transformation of this will obviously impact accuracy of predictions.
• The Vertex & Edge Clustering is stronger than VC, EC and RGM protective approaches. It is more effective
when it faces SL and MFMC attacks, because it is an advanced version of Edge Clustering.
• Randomize Graph Modiﬁcation strategy is sensitive to the supervised learning attack, but not others.
• The Greedy Graph Modiﬁcation strategy may be the strongest protection strategy among these ﬁve. The accu-
racy in most test cases is reduced at least 10% and haft of test cases reach/exceed 20% reduction. Moreover, a
reduction of accuracy even reaches 50%, which is satisﬁed.
4. Related Work
Protection. When researchers ﬁnd out it is possible to re-identify personal information by combining different
public social data sources, privacy becomes an important research issue. The surge of research on privacy preser-
vation in data publishing has achieved a lot on tabular data, which contains only individual attributes (sensitive or
non-sensitive). The non-sensitive attributes, also called “quasi-identiﬁers”, are used to re-identify an individual.
Meanwhile, sensitive attributes should not be recovered even when a group of possible rows is recognized. Moti-
vated by the individual re-identiﬁcation with US voting data with medical records, Sweeney proposed k-anonymity
privacy preserving data publishing technique on microdata [17]. The k-anonymity requires that every tuple in the
microdata table published could only be indistinguishably identiﬁed with k candidates [17][18]. However, all k can-
didates might share the same sensitive attributes. As a result, an attacker could obtain the desired contents without
re-identifying individuals. An extension of k anonymity is to provide l-diversity, which demands these k candidates
must have l different sensitive attributes [19]. Different kinds of other privacy protection concepts and their imple-
mentation algorithms have also been developed, such as t-closeness [20], m-invariance [21], k-similarity [22] and
δ-presence[23], etc.
Attack. Since the on-line social networks began to thrive, there has been a growing interest in the security of
users’ privacy under the current privacy protection. Among the previous work, the attacks using machine learning with
public proﬁle and relation information attract a lot of attention and have great signiﬁcance in the security of on-line
social networks. The attacks employing machine learning methods include supervised learning attacks, unsupervised
learning attacks and semi-supervised learning. As for supervised learning methods, [3] presents that supervised
classiﬁcation can rely not only on the object attributes but also on the attributes of the users it is linked to. Because
linked-based classiﬁcation breaks the data comprises of i.i.d. instances and it can make the classes of linked objects
correlated to each other. Besides, He et al. [4] also predict private attributes using Bayesian network with friendship
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links. A more comprehensive review about collective classiﬁcation can be found in Sen’s work [24]. Recently Elena
and Lise [5] propose a novel attack using group-based supervised classiﬁcation with group membership information
apart from friend links.
5. Conclusion
We apply ﬁve attack algorithms and ﬁve protective approaches on the attack-protect-attack scheme to understand
the performance and biases of these attacks and protections on the online social networks. They are evaluated by the
criterions of accuracy of attacks on a real-world data, Facebook. The experiments illustrate that the performance of
protective strategies are not satisfactory in the complex and practical cases. In the future, we will apply the attack-
protect-attack scheme to more datasets and evaluate attack and protective strategy from different aspects. This would
help us to better understand the practical performance in difference scenarios.
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